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Executive summary
In recent years Pakistan has experienced a 
succession of large-scale natural disasters and 
complex emergencies that have required significant 
humanitarian and military responses. Many of the 
areas hit by natural disasters have also been affected 
by armed conflict or instability, with the national 
military both a belligerent in the conflict and the 
primary responder to disaster. This dual role has made 
coordination between aid agencies and the military in 
these contexts particularly complicated. 
Through interviews with aid workers and Pakistani 
government officials, as well as extensive desk research, 
this report explores the complexities and challenges 
of civil–military coordination in Pakistan. Beginning 
with the earthquake response in 2005, humanitarian 
actors came up against military efforts to utilise 
disaster response activities to ‘win hearts and minds’ 
in the fight against the insurgency in the North-West 
Frontier Province (NWFP, known after 2010 as Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa, or KP). Because the military and 
government tightly controlled access, many aid agencies 
– with varying degrees of reticence and concern about 
their independence and neutrality – were left with no 
choice but to collaborate closely with the military. 
These issues came to a head with the displacement crisis 
in 2008/09, where the military controlled access to 
affected areas and again subordinated the response to 
military and political objectives.  
The development of civil–military guidelines in 
2009–10 was an important step in creating a dialogue 
between aid agencies and the Pakistani military about 
humanitarian principles, particularly in the subsequent 
response to floods in 2010.  While they provided 
some clarity about the respective roles of the military 
and humanitarian actors in response, they were never 
endorsed by the Pakistani government or military and 
the military had limited engagement in civil–military 
coordination fora. Notably, when dialogue occurred, 
there was little discussion of protection issues or 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL).  
The result has been that aid agencies have been 
prevented from engaging with all sides of the 
conflict, damaging perceptions of their neutrality 
and independence, and have been compelled to 
obey the rules established by the Pakistani military 
in order to gain access to affected populations. The 
UN’s lack of humanitarian leadership contributed to 
this problem. Pakistan is a priority context for the 
roll-out of the Transformative Agenda and the UN’s 
humanitarian operations in KP/FATA are largely 
indistinguishable from the government’s broader 
stabilisation agenda. Local organisations also came 
under immense pressure to comply with the wishes of 
the Pakistani military, and were rarely given the space 
or consideration that was afforded to international 
aid agencies. 
The Pakistan government and military remain largely 
in control of the distribution of aid and access to 
affected areas in disaster and conflict responses. 
Although far from perfect, the 2010 guidelines can 
still provide a basis for dialogue and interaction 
– but require continual dissemination and discussion 
if they are to remain relevant.  There must also 
be more critical examination by the UN and aid 
agencies themselves of their own role in supporting 
the Pakistani military effort and the consequences of 
the compromises they have made in order to reach 
civilians in need of their assistance.
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1  Introduction
The succession of natural disasters and complex 
emergencies that Pakistan has experienced in recent 
years has required significant humanitarian and military 
responses. Three major disasters – the earthquake in 
Kashmir in 2005, the displacement crisis in the North-
West Frontier Province (NWFP, known after 2010 
as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, or KP) in 2008–2009 and 
monsoon floods in 2010, interspersed with several 
smaller disasters – affected over 20 million people. 
Many of the areas hit by natural disasters have also 
been affected by armed conflict or instability, with 
the national military both a belligerent in the conflict 
and the primary responder to disaster. This dual role 
has made coordination between aid agencies and the 
military in these contexts particularly complicated. 
The Pakistan military’s role both as first responder 
in disasters and as a belligerent in conflict (and a 
key political player with ubiquitous influence across 
government) poses conceptual and operational 
challenges to civil–military coordination. The 
international humanitarian community’s premise that 
visible interaction with military forces must only be 
as a ‘last resort’, for example in the use of military 
assets or armed escorts, has been tested repeatedly, and 
international humanitarian actors have often struggled 
to define what an appropriate level of engagement with 
the national military might be. A further complicating 
factor in both the 2005 Kashmir earthquake response 
and the 2010 floods was the deployment of foreign 
military assets, including from states that are 
belligerents in the conflict in neighbouring Afghanistan. 
Humanitarian actors have also found it difficult to take 
a consistent line on how to engage with foreign military 
actors. In 2010, the Humanitarian Country Team 
developed civil–military coordination guidelines in an 
attempt to ensure a clear and consistent position with 
national and foreign militaries. The development of 
these guidelines has highlighted differences in definitions 
and perspectives within the spectrum of actors involved, 
and adherence to the guidelines has been inconsistent. 
This paper analyses how civil–military mechanisms 
have evolved over time, the contextual factors that 
have influenced this engagement and the legacy this 
engagement has left for future interactions in this 
disaster-prone region. Following this introduction, 
Section 2 examines the special role played by the 
military in Pakistan’s national life. This discussion 
sets the scene for Section 3, which examines how 
experiences from the 2005 earthquake response and 
2008/09 IDP crisis demonstrated the need for structured 
guidance and prompted the subsequent development 
of Humanitarian Country Team guidelines. Section 4 
explores the impact of the guidelines on civil–military 
interaction in Pakistan, while in Section 5 the 
opportunities for principled and effective civil–military 
coordination in Pakistan are discussed. 
1.1 Methodology
This case study is based on desk research and in-
depth key informant interviews and consultations. 
A preliminary review of literature on civil–military 
interaction and humanitarian response in Pakistan 
was undertaken. Key informants for interviews 
included donors and UN and international and 
local NGO representatives and a limited number of 
government officials at national and provincial levels. 
An independent consultant involved in civil–military 
interaction was also interviewed. Visa issues prevented 
travel to Pakistan for fieldwork, which limited 
engagement with military officials in particular. The 
report therefore reflects primarily the perspective of 
humanitarian organisations.
Interviewees were selected on the basis that they had 
been involved in civil–military coordination, either 
representing their organisation or as part of forums which 
had civil–military coordination as one of their functions. 
Many had been through all three major response episodes 
(the earthquake, the security operations and the floods), 
and all had been part of at least two major disaster 
responses. The interviews were conducted on a non-
attributable basis, mostly via Skype with some through 
telephone conversations. In addition, the research draws 
on interviews from YouTube videos and presentations in 
conferences and seminars by these actors. 
Given the sampling methodology and the limitation 
identified above, the case study does not seek to make 
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conclusive statements. Rather, it is a compilation 
of competing perspectives on a fraught subject. 
Efforts have been made to organise and represent all 
viewpoints, while analysing them with reference to 
international guidelines. Data collection was based on 
a semi-structured set of questions. Although the full set 
of questions was shared with key informants, interviews 
often focused on a few salient issues that informants 
felt strongly about. Issues and themes arising in early 
interviews were probed in subsequent conversations. 
Given the sensitivity of the subject, and to encourage 
frank and open communication, all interviewees were 
assured that their identities would not be disclosed and 
that quotes would not be attributed to any particular 
organisation or individual. When analysing the 
interviews, more weight was given to those who had 
played an active role in civil–military interaction, and 
those who had played a coordination role on behalf of 
their organisation.   
The following research questions guided the interviews: 
1. What developments prepared the ground for civil–
military interaction? For example, what doctrines, 
guidelines, codes of conduct and training preceded 
the first humanitarian–military interactions?
2. What coordination mechanisms were developed 
in the field or at national/HQ level, and how were 
they implemented? 
3. What were the challenges to cohesion amongst 
humanitarian actors on civil–military issues? What 
were the challenges, if any, to cohesion in the 
attitude of military actors to civil military issues? 
4. What were the staff capacities and resources at 
the disposal of different actors for civil–military 
coordination, and how did this affect interaction?
5. What were the attitudes that each actor brought to 
addressing the phenomenon of mass displacement?
A critical limitation was the inability to meet recipients 
of humanitarian aid. As a result, it was not possible 
to assess from their perspective the benefits of civil–
military coordination. Since many reservations about 
interacting with military forces hinge on perceptions 
of neutrality, impartiality and independence, and many 
of the arguments for interaction are premised on the 
humanitarian imperative to save lives, it would have 
been very valuable to ask local communities how they 
saw, experienced and perceived the outcomes of civil–
military interaction. This remains a gap in the overall 
literature on the subject, and is recommended as a 
priority for future studies.
1.2 Terminology and definitions 
Armed non-state actors (ANSAs): ‘Over the last several 
decades, non-state armed groups have become a common 
feature of civil conflicts and internal wars. These Armed 
Non-State Actors (ANSAs) go by many names, including 
liberation movements, rebel groups, paramilitaries, 
insurgents and warlords, mercenaries and private military 
and security companies’ (Glaser, 2005: 1). 
Civil–Military Coordination (CMCoord): ‘CMCoord 
refers specifically to the interaction between 
humanitarian organisations and military actors for 
humanitarian purposes, whereas the broader term 
“civil–military relations” generally refers to the 
interaction between the military and a wider range 
of civilian actors, including civil society, government 
authorities, rule of law, security sector reform, 
human rights and development actors, and can be 
undertaken for a range of objectives’ (Metcalfe, 
Haysom and Gordon, 2012: 2). The Inter-Agency 
Standing Committee (IASC) and the UN Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) define 
humanitarian civil–military coordination as: 
the essential dialogue and interaction between 
civilian and military actors in humanitarian 
emergencies that is necessary to protect and 
promote humanitarian principles, avoid 
competition, minimize inconsistency, and when 
appropriate pursue common goals (OCHA, 
2008).
Civil–Military Cooperation (CIMIC): ‘CIMIC 
is a military term, for which there are varying 
interpretations, but essentially it refers to the 
engagement of military actors with civilians for military 
purposes’ (Metcalfe, Haysom and Gordon, 2012: 2).
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2.1 Historical context 
Since independence in 1947, Pakistan has experienced 
30 years of military rule (1958 to 1971, 1977 
to 1988 and 1999 to 2008); even when not in 
government the military has constantly sought to 
centralise and consolidate political power, and the 
military (notably military intelligence, the Inter-
Services Intelligence (ISI)) exerts significant overt and 
covert control over the civilian authorities in both 
domestic and foreign affairs. Given Pakistan’s volatile 
relationship with India, centred on the decades-long 
conflict for control of Kashmir, Pakistan has always 
been a ‘security state’, and the national military has 
historically been a key player in the geopolitical 
arena. However, information on Pakistan’s armed 
forces is very limited, and interaction with Western 
civilian and military institutions is heavily controlled. 
The climate of secrecy within the Pakistan military 
and its associated security services directly and 
indirectly affects civil–military coordination 
and presents humanitarian actors with a highly 
complicated operational environment. 
2.2 The role of the military in 
Pakistani society
Pakistan’s military has multiple roles: preparing for 
and responding to natural disasters, contributing 
military personnel to UN missions,1 under special 
circumstances maintaining law and order and 
defending Pakistan’s borders and conducting security 
operations, counter-insurgency or counter-terrorism 
operations. Pakistan’s volatile relationship with India 
has ensured that the military has been well-resourced. 
The armed forces consist of the Army (550,000), Navy 
(22,000) and Air Force (70,000), totalling 642,000 
military personnel in active service. Paramilitary 
forces number 304,000, and there is a reserve force 
complement of 500,000. 
The Army is structured using the traditional British 
two-tier hierarchy of officers and enlisted ranks, a 
legacy of colonial rule. Officer ranks follow British 
military naming conventions, the lowest being Second 
Lieutenant and the highest Field Marshal. In addition, 
there are three ranks of Junior Commissioned Officer: 
Naib Subedar, Subedar and Subedar-Major. Non-
Commissioned Officer (NCO) ranks range from Solider 
at the lowest echelon to Battalion Havildar Major at 
the highest. Officers are predominantly drawn from 
Pakistan’s middle classes; indeed, employment as an 
officer is the predominant profession of the middle 
and, increasingly, lower-middle classes. Selection is 
highly competitive, but once recruited members of the 
military and their families enjoy extensive support, 
including medical care at well-equipped facilities and 
a patronage network. According to Lieven (2011), the 
military forms a separate ‘giant kinship group’ that 
‘sees itself as a breed apart, and devotes great effort to 
inculcating in new recruits the feeling that they belong 
to a military family different from (and vastly superior 
to) Pakistani civilian society’. Regionally, the north-
west Punjab and KP and Punjabi and Pashtun/Pathan 
ethnicities respectively have provided the majority of 
military recruits, particularly for the Army (Lieven, 
2011). Moves are being made to make the military 
a more national institution; recruitment initiatives 
have focused on Sindhi, Mohajir and Baloch in an 
effort to increase their numbers in the forces, and new 
cantonments have been built in Sindh and Balochistan. 
What effect this is having on the ethnic make-up of the 
forces is impossible to say as statistics are not made 
available.
Preparing for disaster response has long been part 
of military training. When called on to support civil 
authorities, military assistance has predominantly 
been channelled into less secure areas, with civilian 
actors responding in the more accessible locations. The 
military provides relief and rescue, logistical support, 
engineering expertise, emergency health provision and 
basic reconstruction of infrastructure. The armed forces 
also have a disaster preparedness role, for example by 
coordinating with the civil authorities in maintaining 
water channels, in joint inspections of flood defences 
and participation in pre-monsoon coordination 
2 The Pakistan military 
1	 Pakistan	has	a	long	history	of	contributing	troops	and	police	to	
UN	peacekeeping	operations	and	has	consistently	been	in	the	
top	three	of	contributor	nations.	
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meetings. In relation to complex emergencies, the 
Army feels that it has a legitimate interest not only in 
responding to terrorism but also in rebuilding after 
security operations. Given Pakistan’s longstanding 
commitment and experience as one of the principal 
contributors of troops and police to UN peacekeeping 
operations, it is conceivable that the security services 
consider themselves to be the best organisation to 
address both disaster and conflict. The experience and 
expertise the Pakistan military brings is recognised 
by the humanitarian community, and the Army is 
considered to be a significant player, with the ability to 
provide personnel, logistics and key skills in response 
to disasters. A cross-section of respondents were either 
comfortable with the military role in disaster response, 
or felt that the armed forces were obliged to act due to 
the high level of state funds and government resources 
they received. 
The Army’s counter-insurgency operations against 
Taliban militants began in the Federally Administered 
Tribal Areas (FATA) in 2001, and continue today at 
various points along the Afghan–Pakistan border (the 
Durand Line). Pakistan’s counter-insurgency strategy 
has been described as ‘engage, destroy, and negotiate’, 
the inverse of the ‘clear, hold, build’ strategies of the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)/NATO 
military forces in Afghanistan (Zaidi, 2010). Local 
populations are evacuated before overwhelming force 
and heavy firepower is used to attack militants head-
on; this is followed by the negotiation of a ceasefire. 
Collateral damage, mass internal displacement and 
the destruction of infrastructure have been the result. 
A lack of reconciliation and reconstruction initiatives 
following these offensives has exacerbated the conflict 
and generated increasingly negative opinions of 
military activities among local populations. 
Western governments, especially the US, have been 
supportive of Pakistan’s counter-insurgency operations. 
Foreign aid for disaster response operations, most 
notably from the US, has been used to promote stability 
and gain local and national support for international 
counter-terrorism and stabilisation objectives (see for 
example Gul, 2010; Wilder, 2010; Whittall, 2011). This 
has had an impact on the provision of humanitarian 
aid, with the Pakistan military controlling and in some 
cases blocking aid flows. As discussed in the sections 
that follow, the response to the 2005 earthquake was 
seen as a large-scale ‘hearts and minds’ opportunity by 
national and international military forces, to improve 
local perceptions of military forces and their respective 
governments.2 An essential objective from the national 
military perspective was to decrease local opposition to 
security operations in the mountainous region of South 
Waziristan on the Afghan–Pakistan border. For the 
US, the response was seen as a way to reduce vitriolic 
anti-American sentiment amongst local populations, 
which had been compounded by drone attacks against 
Taliban militants. With the international drawdown 
from Afghanistan scheduled for 2014, Pakistan is 
facing increasing pressure to reform its security 
strategy. In an attempt to stem insurgency and unrest 
during the transition, it is likely that Pakistan will step 
up counter-insurgency operations along the border, 
with significant implications for the humanitarian 
response in this highly troubled region. 
2.3 The relationship between the 
military and Islam 
Islam has long played an important role in the military, 
much as it has in the broader government and nation. 
It has served as a unify factor across ethnic, political 
and other divides. The association of Pakistan itself 
with Islam has also had a rallying purpose, making the 
Army not only a defender of the country but also of the 
Muslim faith. This association has been used to bolster 
morale and create a ‘higher purpose’, particularly with 
regard to the conflict with India: ‘to defend Pakistan is 
to defend Islam’ (Fair, 2011).  
As Haqqani (2005: 3) points out, the relationship 
between Islam and the military has waxed and waned 
over time, and ‘its character has changed with the twists 
and turns in Pakistani history’. Although Islam’s role 
in the military traces its roots further back (arguably to 
the country’s second military commander, General Agha 
Mohammad Yahya), it came to the fore with General 
Zia-ul-Haq’s rise to power in the 1970s. Islamic training 
was introduced in the curriculum of the Command 
and Staff College and religious groups were allowed 
to distribute materials to officers. Secular officers were 
either forced to adopt Islam or retire (Gondal, 2011). 
Islamic organisations have played a major role in 
relief efforts. In the aftermath of the 2005 earthquake, 
2	 A	World	Bank	study	identified	a	measurable	change	in	the	
public	perception	of	donor	countries	based	on	the	humanitarian	
support	provided	during	the	2005	earthquake	(Andrabi	and	Das,	
2010).	However,	Wilder	(2010)	has	argued	that	these	positive	
perceptions	were	not	sustained.	
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jihadi and Islamist groups were the first to provide 
assistance (Qureshi, 2006; Wilder, 2010). As Wilder 
(2010) observes, ‘members of jihadi groups, many 
of whom had been trained at camps for Kashmiri 
militant groups in the earthquake-affected areas of 
the NWFP and PaK, had the tremendous advantage 
of knowing the terrain and the people, and of having 
close ties with and support from the Pakistan Army’ 
(Wilder, 2010: S417). By contrast, Pakistan’s civil 
administration was slow to respond, a consequence 
of years of budgetary neglect and military dominance 
(Bamforth, 2006).
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Pakistan has suffered a series of catastrophic natural 
events in recent years, with earthquakes in 2002, 2005, 
2008, 2011 and 2013 and devastating floods in 2007, 
2010, 2011 and 2012. In addition, conflict and counter-
insurgency operations have triggered mass displacement, 
notably in the Swat Valley following security operations 
against the Taliban in 2008–2009. Drawing on examples 
from the 2005 earthquake response and 2008/09 
IDP crisis, this section looks at how these experiences 
demonstrated the need for structured guidance 
and prompted the subsequent development of the 
Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) guidelines.  
3.1 The need for structured 
guidance: the 2005 earthquake 
and the 2008/9 displacement 
crisis
3.1.1 The earthquake response
On the morning of 8 October 2005 a devastating 
earthquake measuring 7.6 on the Richter scale 
struck Pakistan, its epicentre located near 
Muzaffarabad in Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJ&K). 
The earthquake flattened towns and villages along 
its fault line, affecting both AJ&K and NWFP and 
killing over 73,000 people. A series of aftershocks 
followed, causing landslides that compounded the 
effects of the disaster. The devastation left in the 
earthquake’s wake was acute; for example, the 
town of Balakot in NWFP was destroyed, with only 
15% of its 40,000 inhabitants surviving. Hospitals, 
communication infrastructure and homes were 
decimated. Over 3.5 million people throughout the 
region were affected, many of them located in hard-
to-reach mountainous areas with poor infrastructure 
and road access. With winter approaching it was 
imperative that disaster response was provided 
quickly (Khan, 2006). 
In the aftermath of the earthquake, the Pakistan 
Army, as has been the case in the majority of natural 
disasters, stepped in and took control of the initial 
relief response. It became the backbone of the relief 
effort, along with international military logistic 
support to reach isolated areas using military aircraft. 
International humanitarian agencies were faced 
with conflicts of interest and dilemmas relating to 
humanitarian obligations, either through direct 
association with the Army or indirectly through the 
military-dominated Earthquake Reconstruction and 
Rehabilitation Authority (ERRA). To be awarded 
reconstruction contracts it was necessary to engage 
with the ERRA, and the national military was heavily 
involved in reconstruction work. As a result, local 
authorities were weakened and their legitimacy 
3 The development of the 
 Humanitarian Country Team 
 guidelines 
The	lack	of	an	overarching	framework	governing	
the	plethora	of	actors	offering	assistance	led	the	
Pakistan	government	to	create	the	Federal	Relief	
Commission	(FRC),	with	funding	assistance	from	
the	UN	Development	Programme	(UNDP),	and	
the	Earthquake	Rehabilitation	and	Reconstruction	
Authority	(ERRA)	(Cochrane,	2008).	The	FRC	
had	both	national	military	and	civilian	compo-
nents,	with	the	military	side	focusing	on	initial	
search,	rescue	and	relief	efforts,	and	the	civilian	
side	looking	after	‘inter-department	and	inter-
agency	issues’	(Khan,	2006:	2).	The	ERRA	
became	more	active	in	the	later	stages	of	the	
response,	through	‘consequence	management’,	
recovery,	rehabilitation	and	reconstruction	(ibid.:	
3).	Neither	the	FRC	nor	the	ERRA	was	estab-
lished	with	the	sanction	of	the	Pakistan	parlia-
ment,	and	each	was	led	by	an	Army	general.
Box 1: The Federal Relief Commission and the 
Earthquake Rehabilitation and Reconstruction 
Authority
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was undermined (Bamforth, 2006). The majority 
of humanitarian actors accepted that, in order to 
gain access to vulnerable populations, interaction 
and pragmatic cooperation with the military was 
unavoidable, and the politics of the Pakistan military 
and its involvement in counter-insurgency and counter-
terrorism activities was set aside. 
The earthquake response and subsequent 
coordination process facilitated collaboration 
between the international humanitarian community 
and the military-dominated national government. 
This resulted in ‘one of the rare cases where national 
and international coordination set-ups for emergency 
response coincided’ (Péchayre, 2011: 5). In 2007, 
alongside seven other countries, Pakistan volunteered 
to pioneer the ‘One UN’ initiative. The initiative’s 
objective was to streamline processes by designating 
one lead coordinating agency, one operational 
support system and one budget framework (IASC, 
2007). However, floods in 2007 hit the country 
when the main stakeholders were in the process 
of implementing the ‘One UN’ initative, and an 
underfunded and understaffed UN meant that extra 
reliance was placed on the national military. This, 
coupled with the development of a close working 
relationship with the Pakistan government during 
the emergency phase of the earthquake response, 
compromised the UN’s ability to advocate for 
humanitarian standards and undermined the trust 
and support of many aid agencies. Thus, while 
there were ‘strong programmatic arguments for 
government involvement in the clusters, to avoid 
duplication and facilitate impact, there was little 
discussion of the implications of the Pakistani 
military’s heavy involvement in coordination 
mechanisms’. In turn, this made it ‘difficult for 
humanitarians to address some of the more obvious 
drawbacks in not adhering to the principles of 
humanitarian action’ (HPG, 2009: 4). 
Meanwhile, many religious groups were not part 
of these discussions or coordination mechanisms. 
Wilder points out that ‘[t]he failure actively to 
encourage Islamist organisations to participate in 
UN-led coordination meetings, and at times the 
active discouragement of their participation, was 
perceived [by some] as an important shortcoming of 
coordination efforts’ (Wilder, 2010: S419). Except 
in cases where there were contractual obligations 
stemming from funding relationships, none of 
these bodies had any enforcement mechanisms, and 
the wide spectrum of views on a variety of issues, 
including civil–military interaction, made it difficult 
to arrive at and enforce cohesive policies. 
3.1.2 The 2008/9 IDP crisis
The Pakistan Army has carried out offensives 
against the Pakistani Taliban, predominantly in 
FATA, since 2001. Operations escalated in 2007, 
and between mid-2008 and 2009 the Army led a 
series of major offensives against Taliban militants in 
both the NWFP and FATA. In 2008 these offensives 
triggered the displacement of 500,000 people. In 
April and May 2009 the Pakistan Army attacked 
Taliban militants occupying the town of Mingora 
in the Swat valley, displacing a further three million 
people at very short notice. Although slow to react, 
a national and international humanitarian response 
was instigated at a number of points during the 
Army offensives. Relatives sheltered the majority of 
IDPs, and many others settled in camps set up across 
NWFP. While the worst of the fighting had subsided 
by July 2009, allowing some IDPs to return home, an 
estimated one million were still displaced in 2013.3 
A number of coordination problems arose during 
the IDP crisis. Issues ranged from national military 
control of access to affected populations, determining 
the phases of the disaster response based on military 
priorities, influencing needs assessment processes,4 
engineering the return of IDPs, for example by 
cutting electricity and water supplies, and military 
discrimination against those considered to be 
supportive of militant factions (Péchayre, 2011). 
There have also been allegations of exclusion; one 
example cited concerned access to cash grants, an 
entitlement under the government’s flood response 
scheme: ‘although the government pledged to give 
each displaced family a cash grant of approximately 
$300, many have been excluded [by the national 
military], reportedly for reasons of financial, cultural 
and political expediency’ (HPG, 2009). Shah (2011: 
17) noted that, during the security operations 
in 2008/09, ‘the military [acquired] land for 
cantonments under compulsory land acquisition laws. 
The price offered to the owners [was] much lower 
than the market rate, but owners have no option but 
to accede. Compensation payments are inadequate to 
meet loses’.   
3	 See	‘2014	UNHCR	Country	Operations	Profile	–	Pakistan’,	
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e487016.html.
4	 HPG	interview	with	senior	humanitarian	worker.
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3.2 The guideline development 
process 
The 2005 earthquake and the 2008–2009 IDP crises 
demonstrated the need for clarity in civil–military 
coordination, both in terms of leadership and written 
guidelines. In 2009–10, before the onset of the 2010 
floods, the Humanitarian Country Team led by the 
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (OCHA) developed a series of guidelines in an 
attempt to provide this clarity.5
While the humanitarian community recognises the 
need for some form of interaction with national and 
international military forces and the important role 
played by Pakistan’s military in disaster response, 
the 2005 earthquake and the 2008–2009 IDP crisis 
highlighted a significant lack of discussion around the 
implications of extensive national military involvement 
in relief response. The conflated and interwoven roles 
of the national military – as belligerent, first responder, 
leader in coordination and gatekeeper in terms of 
access, in addition to the strong national military 
influence over civilian affairs – has made it difficult for 
the international humanitarian community to negotiate 
the tricky and complex boundaries between pragmatic 
and principled approaches (HPG, 2009: 4). The 
2005 earthquake response showed an overwhelming 
propensity among many humanitarian actors (national 
and international) to informally adopt pragmatic 
approaches at the expense of the humanitarian 
principles of impartiality, neutrality and independence. 
Despite the Pakistan government’s reluctance to allow 
international engagement in stabilisation operations 
in Pakistan, this still demonstrates the pervasiveness 
of wider international ‘stabilisation’ agendas and 
associated political and military objectives. The shift 
towards complex emergencies and increasingly critical 
debate around the civil–military balance in Pakistan 
has forced a shift from pragmatic towards more 
principled approaches. 
The guidelines evolved to provide clarity and unity 
for all actors involved in civil–military coordination, 
increase awareness of civil–military cooperation 
principles during natural disasters and complex 
emergencies and act as a tool for the international 
humanitarian community to help address challenges to 
principled approaches as they arose. Other influential 
drivers included increasing national military regulation 
of access to disaster-stricken areas and populations, 
growing concern from the humanitarian community 
about the slow progress of aid efforts, the need for the 
maintenance of professional standards and the initial 
willingness of the Pakistan government to engage in 
conversations around civil–military interaction.
5	 Guidelines	for	a	number	of	complex	operating	environments	
have	been	developed	by	the	international	humanitarian	
community,	including	Iraq,	Afghanistan,	Sudan,	Chad,	the	
Democratic	Republic	of	Congo	(DRC)	and	Haiti.
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The guidelines were produced in 2009/10 by an 
Islamabad-based Humanitarian Country Team 
comprising a working group of key UN agencies 
(including OCHA, the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Food Programme 
(WFP)) and NGOs and observed by the International 
Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement. The working 
group was chaired by the Humanitarian Coordinator 
and led by OCHA. As Metcalfe and Berg (2012: 4) 
outline, ‘The process in Pakistan was comprehensive 
both in terms of scope and participation … OCHA 
initially conducted a survey of the key actors on civil–
military issues and thematic groups addressing issues 
highlighted in the survey results were created to review 
the draft guidelines’.6 Each thematic group comprised 
a UN representative, a national NGO representative 
and an international NGO representative, ‘thereby 
ensuring a more comprehensive and inclusive process’. 
The resulting Draft Guidelines for Civil–Military 
Coordination in Pakistan are informed by three 
broader sets of civil–military guidelines. The first is 
the UN Guidelines On The Use Of Military And 
Civil Defence Assets To Support United Nations 
Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies, 
otherwise known as the MCDA Guidelines. Developed 
by a consortium of international agencies in 2003, 
these are used predominantly in complex emergencies. 
The second, the Oslo Guidelines (also known as the 
Guidelines for the Use of Foreign Military and Civil 
Defence Assets in Disaster Relief), was developed 
in 1994 and updated by a collaboration of 45 UN 
member states and 25 international organisations in 
2006 (and revised in 2007); they are used in peacetime 
only. Finally, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee 
(IASC) provides a selection of policy frameworks to 
help coordinate civil–military interaction. The 2008 
IASC volume, Civil–Military Guidelines & Reference 
for Complex Emergencies, draws together the updated 
MCDA guidelines in addition to Civil–Military 
Relationship in Complex Emergencies (an IASC 
Reference Paper, June 2004) and Use of Military or 
Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys  (IASC 
Discussion Paper and Non-Binding Guidelines, 
September 2001). 
The resulting country-specific guidelines for Pakistan 
were approved by the HCT on 5 March 2010. They 
are built around nine key objectives: 
• Humanitarian actors must be able to provide 
assistance in accordance with the basic principles of 
humanity, neutrality and impartiality. 
• Humanitarian assistance is extended with full 
respect for state sovereignty. 
• Humanitarian actors must retain their ability to 
access vulnerable people in all crisis-affected areas. 
• At all times, a clear distinction must be maintained 
between humanitarian and military actors. 
• The independence of humanitarian action and 
decision-making must be preserved both at the 
operational and policy levels. 
• Considerations of civil–military coordination must 
be guided by a commitment to ‘do no harm’. 
• Humanitarian assistance occurs with the ownership 
of the civil government and disaster management 
organisations. 
• The use of military assets, armed escorts, joint 
humanitarian–military interventions and any 
other actions involving visible interaction with the 
military must be the option of last resort, where 
there are no comparable civilian alternative to meet 
a critical humanitarian need. 
• Respect must be maintained for the culture, 
structures and customs of the communities where 
humanitarian activities are carried out (Draft 
Guidelines, 2010: 4). 
The guidelines differentiate between ‘coexistence’ 
during complex emergencies and ‘cooperation’ in 
times of peace, as the degree of interaction and the 
ramifications for the safety of local populations and 
humanitarian agencies and secure access will differ 
depending on the level of conflict and armed violence. 
To assist the humanitarian community in negotiating 
the use of national and international military assets 
4 The impact of the guidelines  
6	 These	included	groups	on	information-sharing	and	liaison,	
humanitarian	access,	use	of	military	assets,	distinction	between	
military	and	humanitarian	interventions,	joint	civil–military	
interventions,	mine	action,	training	and	awareness-raising,	
civil–military	coordination	in	early	recovery	responses	and	
civil–military	coordination	in	disasters	(Metcalfe,	2012).
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(for example helicopters and boats) and safeguard the 
concept of ‘last resort’, the guidelines outline a series 
of checks. As Bennett (2011: 12) summarises: 
1.  Use of the asset is based solely on humanitarian 
criteria. 
2.  It is a last resort, when a highly vulnerable 
population cannot be assisted or reached by any 
other means and there is no appropriate civilian 
alternative. 
3.  The urgency of the task at hand demands 
immediate action.
4.  Use of the asset is clearly limited in time and  
scale.
5.  Use of the asset is approved by the HCT.
To facilitate civil–military coordination the guidelines 
recommend the establishment of four forums: a Civil–
Military Coordination Steering Committee; Provincial 
Civil–Military Coordination Working Groups; Field 
Liaison Arrangements; and a Humanitarian Working 
Group on Civil–Military Coordination. The Pakistan 
guidelines give more detail than comparable country 
guidelines on the relationships between government, 
military and humanitarian actors, while also providing 
guidance for the military in relation to information-
sharing (Metcalfe and Berg, 2012). 
Expectations varied between participants on what 
the guidelines could achieve. Although not mutually 
exclusive, some (many local and INGOs, and WFP 
and the International Organisation for Migration 
(IOM) among the UN agencies) saw them as a 
way of engaging on access issues; others (including 
OCHA and some of the more outspoken INGOs 
such as Oxfam, ActionAid and the International 
Rescue Committee (IRC)) saw them as a mechanism 
to expand humanitarian space and safeguard 
humanitarian principles by defining roles and 
boundaries; and actors such as OCHA, Oxfam and 
the IRC were keen to establish a basis to engage 
with foreign militaries and governments that were 
considered to be subsuming humanitarian aims 
beneath larger political and military objectives. As 
Bennett (2011: 12) has pointed out, while the HCT 
guidelines aimed to establish a unified position 
to guide operational practice, the experience also 
‘revealed a selective regard for agreed principles 
among certain stakeholders (both within and outside 
of the humanitarian community), and has raised 
questions about humanitarian agencies’ actual 
understanding of basic civil–military principles’. 
On the government’s part, several informants 
(the former head of the NDMA General Nadeem 
Ahmed; the head of the PDMA in Punjab; and a 
civil–military expert who provides consultancy 
services to governments, the UN and INGOs based in 
Pakistan) said that it was never the intention of the 
government to endorse the guidelines. Government 
officials interviewed were of the opinion that the 
guidelines were unlikely to be endorsed. As one senior 
government official put it:
Yes, I am aware of the guidelines OCHA put 
together. That does not affect us but it is, as I 
understand, to govern the relationship between 
the military and the international actors. We 
go by our national laws and regulations and 
periodic circulars on dealing with the military. 
Civil–military coordination for us therefore 
means a different thing to that which the 
guidelines are concerned with. The UN has used 
it to ensure that the meetings are not held in 
military camps. The Government mechanism 
does not take the guidelines on civil–military 
interactions as a formal document. It is unlikely 
that it will be endorsed by the Government of 
Pakistan and communicated to us in the form of 
a circular.
However, there was an expectation from the 
international humanitarian community that they 
would be agreed jointly, or at least be a formally 
recognised instrument with the backing of the Pakistan 
government. Metcalfe and Berg (2012: 4) note that 
the process of developing the guidelines ‘faced serious 
challenges. Gaining agreement on the need for such 
guidance and then building consensus on its content 
was problematic, requiring difficult and protracted 
negotiations’. A more detailed and clearer definition 
of the need for the guidelines may have helped in 
developing consensus. While using the global template 
ensured that the guidelines were consistent with the 
basic principles of civil–military interaction, a well-
defined scope of work for their development could have 
encouraged more open engagement with a broader 
group of actors. As it was, developing consensus 
was hindered by the limited engagement of national 
government bodies and the military in the process, 
although a draft was shared with both the NDMA and 
the military to inform them of developments. 
Although the topics covered by the working groups 
were comprehensive, participation was limited to 
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a core group of INGOs. Despite the process being 
open, it was apparent that some INGOs did not 
participate. In addition, a lack of involvement of local 
organisations (NGOs) as well as some of the larger 
national organisations was a significant drawback. 
These actors felt that they were outside of the guideline 
development process: ‘They were not involved and they 
did not care. They think it is for regulating INGOs’ 
interaction with military on their security, NOC [No 
Objection Certificate]7 and access’.8 However, those 
interviewees who had been involved, either as part of 
a working group or the HCT, indicated that awareness 
was raised to the importance of humanitarian 
principles among international humanitarian actors. 
It is unclear whether a more inclusive approach, 
with appropriate representation from the national 
government, military and international and local 
NGOs during the developmental stage, would have 
increased overall buy-in. 
The fact that neither the government nor the 
military endorsed the HCT guidelines affected their 
contribution to overall interaction in the response 
to the devastating floods in 2010. Flooding began 
in Balochistan in late July, followed in August by 
flooding in KPK, parts of FATA, Punjab and then 
finally Sindh. By September Manchar Lake in Sindh 
had overflowed and floodwater was being pushed 
further into the province. In total, an area equivalent 
to one-fifth of the country was under water. The 
floods displaced over 20m people, one-tenth of 
Pakistan’s population. Key infrastructure was either 
The	NDMA	has	produced	a	range	of	documents	
to	outline	policies,	frameworks,	guidelines	and	
‘lessons	learned’	in	Pakistan’s	response	to	disaster.	
The	most	influential	are	the	National Disaster 
Response Plan	(NDRP)	(March	2010),	Pakistan 
Flood 2010 – Learning from Experience (September	
2011),	Disaster Risk Management Needs Report	
(2012)	and	the	Disaster	Risk	Reduction	(DRR)	
policy	(forthcoming).	The	NDMA’s	Pakistan 
Flood 2010	document	lists	four	recommenda-
tions	in	relation	to	‘Civil–Military	Cooperation	and	
Complementarity’	(2011:	95):	
1.		NDMA,	in	conjunction	with	relevant	partners	
(such	as	UN	OCHA,	international	Civil–Military	
Centres	of	Excellence	and	others),	should	
regularly	conduct	civil–military/multi-agency	
training	courses	for	military,	humanitarian,	
police,	and	relevant	Government	agencies.	
This	should	also	include	training	on	SPHERE	
standards	for	humanitarian	response,	which	
some	stakeholders	felt	were	compromised	at	
some	stages	of	the	response.	
2.		A	guide	to	roles	and	responsibilities,	including	
SOPs	[standard	operating	procedures],	should	
be	prepared	by	NDMA	as	a	‘road-map’	to	
inform	all	stakeholders	of	the	expectations	
and	operational	parameters	operating	in	relief	
efforts.	
3.	 	Discussion	on	civil–military	issues	should	be	
a	permanent	agenda	item	of	a	Stakeholder	
Strategic	Leaders	Group.	
4.		NDMA	must	enhance	its	role	in	coordinating	
the	flow	of	information	between	civil	and	
military	responders.	PDMAs	[Provincial	Disaster	
Management	Authorities]	and	DDMAs	[District	
Disaster	Management	Authorities]	should	play	
a	similar	role	at	provincial	and	district	level	to	
ensure	prompt	resolution	of	any	civil–military	
communication	issues	that	arise	in	the	field.	
(NDMA,	2011:	97).	
Issues	identified	‘related	to	adherence	to	inter-
national	civil–military	guidelines,	and	the	need	
for	more	specific	guidelines	for	Pakistan	to	bring	
clarity,	define	the	parameters	of	interaction,	and	
ensure	humanitarian	principles	are	respected	in	
disaster	response’	(NDMA,	2011:	95).	Given	the	
NDMA’s	acknowledgement	of	the	need	for	more	
specific	guidelines	for	Pakistan	and	its	recognition	
of	humanitarian	principles,	an	NDMA-led	guideline	
development	process	could	provide	a	more	inclu-
sive	set	of	guidelines	with	greater	buy-in	across	the	
breadth	of	actors	involved
Box 2: NDMA policies and frameworks
7	 All	relief,	humanitarian	and	early	recovery	programmes	or	
projects	require	a	‘No	Objection	Certificate’	(NOC),	issued	
by	the	government	of	Pakistan.	The	certificate	represents	
the	culmination	of	a	series	of	government	checks	to	ensure	
adequate	project	coordination	with	the	government.	
8	 HPG	interview	with	a	senior	INGO	staff	member.
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obliterated or severely damaged, with bridges and 
roads washed away. Thousands of people became 
marooned as the floodwaters rose. Over 1,900 lives 
were lost, 1.7m homes were damaged or destroyed, 
200,000 livestock were killed and vast quantities of 
agricultural produce perished.
Despite the aim of establishing new coordination 
mechanisms, the Civil–Military Coordination Steering 
Committee and the Humanitarian Working Group on 
Civil–Military Coordination were the only coordination 
mechanisms formerly established in the flood response. 
Other civil–military coordination forums envisaged 
in the guidelines operated on an ad hoc basis without 
any regularity. Instead, government forums were used. 
The lack of engagement from national institutions, 
local organisations and some INGOs has influenced 
the degree to which the guidelines were used, in terms 
of ‘training, in operational decision-making, advocacy 
[and] policy development’ (Metcalfe and Berg, 2012: 5). 
While some agencies were conversant with the global 
guidelines governing these situations, many others 
were not. The guidelines were also criticised for being 
inaccessible in terms of length and conceptual language 
(many interviewees said that they were not aware if the 
guidelines had been translated into local languages), 
suggesting the need to develop concise and accessible 
operational annexes. The annexes that have been 
produced, for example in relation to ‘last resort’, have 
been useful. 
Frequent turnover of military and humanitarian 
staff and insufficient staff training on the guidelines 
have reinforced a lack of general awareness. One 
key challenge is the unrealistic expectations from 
humanitarian actors with respect to what civil–
military coordination or the guidelines could do. For 
example, it was not possible or within their mandate 
for coordination bodies to ensure that the military 
provided relevant information about its assistance. 
Whether the guidelines will be dropped or referred to 
again remains to be seen, though some interviewees 
for this study were optimistic about the use of the 
guidelines in the future and an OCHA review of the 
guidelines in 2012–2013 found them to be relevant 
and recommended their continued use. 
Many local organisations partner with international 
NGOs or the UN to implement projects. While 
international organisations are heavily involved 
at the operational level – through clusters and 
working groups with the scope to influence policy 
– government restrictions mean that tactical 
implementation is primarily undertaken by local 
organisations. Three years after the guidelines were 
developed, many local organisations were either 
unaware of their key features and principles, or 
believed that they were not relevant to them. This is 
not surprising given local organisations’ very limited 
exposure to the debate and their absence from the 
guideline development process: ‘For them this exercise 
has remained irrelevant, they have remained outside 
the process of guideline development and roll out’.9 
As Shah (2011: 18) has highlighted, ‘International 
organisations look at things in black and white in light 
of humanitarian principles’, highlighting that what is 
needed is understanding that ‘matters at the local level 
are most often played out in shades of grey’. 
Although the great majority of local organisations 
interact with military forces, levels of engagement 
depend on the politics of each NGO. Socio-cultural 
and political realties mean that local organisations 
have some form of interaction with the military, most 
of which is informal, for survival, safety, access and 
mobility, and to get work done. During interviews 
some international staff observed that it was at times 
difficult to engage with local NGOs as they were 
seen to be too close to the military. Indeed, at times 
the military would insist on using particular local 
NGOs as implementing partners. Local organisations 
are acutely aware of the risks involved in engaging 
with military forces, but have little influence over 
Pakistan’s civil administration and military and receive 
less considerate treatment than their international 
counterparts. For local organisations, ‘Advocating and 
lobbying for the rights of people … is a dangerous 
undertaking, and many who have tried to do so have 
been silenced or killed. This makes it very difficult for 
civil society organisations, whose main objective is 
to ensure that ordinary people’s voices are heard, to 
highlight issues involving the army’ (Shah, 2011: 18). 
International organisations need to develop greater 
understanding of the ways in which their local NGO 
implementing partners work, in order to assist in 
influencing national military forces. 
The authority to allow access principally rests with 
the host country government and is enforced by the 
military. The Army’s 11th Corps based in Peshawar has 
been in charge of providing ‘No Objection Certificates’ 
9	 ODI	interview	with	a	senior	humanitarian	worker.
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(NOCs), which are required for travel (providing 
a form of security clearance) and all humanitarian 
projects. NOCs are valid for three months, but can 
be extended for six and then nine months. Access is 
tightly controlled and restricted, and NGOs, especially 
INGOs, must demonstrate to the authorities that they 
are trustworthy, transparent and open. Respondents 
noted that it is easier to convince the military of an 
NGO/INGO’s benefit when activities were limited to 
humanitarian assistance rather than civilian protection. 
The civilian authorities seem to find it difficult to make 
and enforce a consistent policy regarding visas and 
residency permits for international NGO personnel. The 
process is haphazard, and left largely to the discretion 
of consular officials abroad. Similarly, there is no 
discernible pattern in the renewal of Memoranda of 
Understanding (MoUs) for NGOs active in Pakistan, 
or to the granting of NOCs to their staff in certain 
problem areas (OCHA, 2013). 
Following the 2008–09 IDP crisis, concerns 
surrounding accessibility increased amongst INGOs. 
One informant referred to the government holding 
up the issuing of NOCs as a way of restricting 
access. Since the 2010 floods, access has gradually 
improved (although not for expatriate workers) in 
many parts of the country, except in more insecure 
areas.  Again, it was not clear how much of this was 
attributable to the HCT guidelines, and how much 
was a direct result of the situation improving on the 
ground. If current obstacles to humanitarian action are 
deliberate, as opposed to mostly accidental, political 
lobbying through diplomatic pressure on Islamabad 
may generate the required policy changes. However, 
the levers for exerting this kind of influence are at 
present limited, and in any case civilian leadership of 
humanitarian responses in Pakistan is largely nominal. 
For contacts with external actors, the military as first 
responder defers to civilian authorities, which tend 
to act as a buffer against outside interference in the 
humanitarian and stabilisation spheres. Alternatively, 
humanitarians can opt to approach the problem 
at the working level, and seek to address issues 
through a more operational dialogue geared towards 
streamlining current regulations and processes. This 
more pragmatic approach tends to be favoured as it is 
politically less contentious. The question remains as to 
how well this is working.
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While global and country-specific guidelines on 
civil–military interaction have a strong preference 
for a predominantly civilian character to assistance, 
the ubiquitous role of the military in Pakistan means 
that working with the government indirectly involves 
working with the military as a key political player 
with large budgetary control and influence over the 
civil administration, and a constitutional obligation 
to respond to both complex emergencies and natural 
disasters. The government and military remain 
in control of access and the distribution of aid to 
vulnerable people in crisis-affected areas. This is in 
part due to the fragility of the civilian government and 
the need for local people to see both government and 
military responses as quick and effective. 
The majority of aid workers and civilian 
administrators interviewed for this study indicated 
that relations with the Pakistan military had 
improved over the last two years. This improvement 
was attributed to increasing familiarity, humanitarian 
workers accepting the rules of engagement, 
greater clarity in approval processes (such as 
NOCs) and coordination mechanisms gradually 
becoming streamlined. Despite numerous criticisms, 
interviewees felt that the draft civil–military 
guidelines had established humanitarian principles 
as a cornerstone of discussions with the military. 
Although agencies had been raising these issues in 
KPK and FATA for years, clearly elaborating them 
in the guidelines appeared to carry more weight with 
the military. 
The presence of guidelines is not a solution, but 
a means to a solution. It is imperative that the 
guidelines are revisited during crises, and that 
functional channels of communication and a working 
relationship exist between the critical actors (namely 
OCHA, government interlocutors and the military). 
For instance, it was mentioned that military officials 
‘who were negotiating operational arrangements and 
taking decisions around foreign military assistance 
did not have civil–military guidelines as one of their 
concerns at that time. It became an issue only after 
the go ahead was given. There wasn’t the required 
working relationship either, which had to do with 
the leadership and personnel at these institutions’.10 
This lack of proactive communication in relation 
to principles and criteria was also noted by OCHA, 
and it was emphasised that early communication 
would have helped reduce the misunderstandings 
and disagreements that arose during the 2010 floods 
(Bennett, 2011). 
The timing of further guideline development is crucial. 
The current draft was developed at a time when 
relations between the military, the government and 
the humanitarian community were at a very low ebb. 
With improving relations it is possible that further 
guideline development could result in broader buy-in. 
The guidelines should form part of an overarching 
civil–military engagement strategy that outlines the 
objectives the humanitarian community hopes to 
achieve through civil–military interaction. 
Based on their experiences, most international 
agencies consider interaction with the military in 
Pakistan a necessity. Guidelines lose their salience 
as they pass down the chain of practitioners to local 
operational actors primarily concerned with getting 
the job done. They must be anchored in a strategy 
that local organisations can relate to, and must be 
widely disseminated. The humanitarian community 
must develop a more proactive and positive set of 
objectives for civil–military engagement which takes 
into consideration the expected impact on the affected 
community and the different conditions in different 
areas of the country. Regular and structured meetings 
and forums at strategic, operational and tactical levels, 
which bring together the range of actors involved in 
civil–military coordination issues, are much needed. If 
possible, this should form part of the guidelines. 
Interviews for this study also suggested tactical 
measures that were useful in improving civil–military 
coordination. These included requests for a committed 
regional military liaison officer who was accessible (by 
phone and in person) and the development of courses 
based on humanitarian principles. The mandate, scope 
5 Conclusion 
10	HPG	interview	with	senior	humanitarian	worker.
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of work and principled basis of interaction should be 
publicised at local level among all those engaging in 
humanitarian work, enabling local NGOs and agencies 
to channel concerns on a non-attributable basis to 
civil–military coordination fora. However, while there 
is a need for local NGO involvement, it is unclear how 
best to establish relations at the local level.
Within the constraints of their foreign policy aims, the 
question remains whether the key international players 
are really doing all they can to advance – or at least 
not to hold back – the application of humanitarian 
principles in Pakistan. A robust, concerted stance 
on this is unlikely from external players – regional 
developments and related security goals leave little 
scope for this at the moment. Nonetheless, within 
the limits in place, and under the broad label of 
good humanitarian donorship, a fair amount of 
latitude does exist for bilateral actors to help firm 
up the humanitarian community’s compliance with 
its own principles. This involves funding projects 
that measurably contribute to operationalising 
humanitarian standards, such as the IDP Vulnerability 
Assessment and Profiling (IVAP) project, and making 
explicit the essential prerequisites for financial support 
to programmes. By and large, this is what DFID and 
other European donors are attempting to do. The 
UNDP’s early recovery programme for KP/FATA 
stalled and was finally subsumed under the UN’s larger 
Humanitarian Operational Plan for that region largely 
due to concerns among some donors over the risk 
that it might abet forced IDP returns. More recently, 
at the instigation of ECHO in Islamabad, a number 
of donors called on the HCT to follow its own 
guidelines in the course of its response to population 
displacement from Tirah Valley. 
The UN’s lack of leadership in humanitarian 
advocacy in Pakistan also requires further attention. 
Pakistan is a priority context for the roll-out of the 
Transformative Agenda, which should in principle 
enable better overall compliance with humanitarian 
principles at the operational level. However, the UN’s 
humanitarian operations in KP/FATA continue to be 
largely indistinguishable from the government’s broader 
stabilisation agenda. In the more straightforward 
context of natural disasters, its independence in 
assessing needs remains minimal. The UN’s lack of 
assertiveness towards the Pakistani government is a 
defining trait of its humanitarian operations in Pakistan. 
Comparably, another trait of the local context is a 
near-seamless continuum between counter-insurgency, 
stabilisation and substantive recovery warranting 
legitimate UN support. It takes dedicated resources and 
considerable expertise to work with a host government 
while maintaining independence. However, that 
policy-level expertise and the dedication to instil it in 
operational decisions seem to be lacking in Pakistan.
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